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Shaping Input Tax Incentives for Companies 
Spending on R&D under the 2016 CCTB 
Directive Proposal
In this article, the author examines R&D 
incentives under the 2016 CCTB Directive 
Proposal.
1.  Towards a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base
In March 2011, the European Commission launched a 
proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCTB).1 The CCCTB proposal envisaged an optional 
system for companies to apply a common set of rules to 
compute taxable profits, including the ability to form a 
consolidated group, wherever based in the European 
Union. Its main objective was to create a corporate tax 
system that treats the European Union as a Single Market 
for the purpose of computing the corporate tax base of 
companies, which would facilitate cross-border activ-
ity for companies resident in the European Union and 
promote the objective of making it a more competitive 
location for investment internationally. For this reason, 
the 2011 proposal for a CCCTB focused on the objective 
of facilitating the expansion of commercial activity for 
businesses within the European Union. 
Due to a lack of progress on the 2011 proposal in the 
Council, the Commission relaunched the CCCTB pro-
posal in October 2016.2 The relaunch of the CCCTB pro-
posal lies at the heart of the Communication “A Fair and 
Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 
Key Areas for Action”3 and the Commission’s Action Plan 
for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the EU.4 
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2011), EU Law IBFD [2011 Proposed CCCTB Directive].
2. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2016) 683 final (25 Oct. 2016), EU Law 
IBFD [2016 Proposed CCCTB Directive]. 
3. Commission Communication,  A Fair and Efficient  Corporate Tax 
System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, COM(2015) 
302 final (17 June 2015), EU Law IBFD.
4. On 17 June 2015, the European Commission published its Action 
Plan for a fair and efficient corporate taxation in the European Union. 
This Action Plan sets out a series of initiatives to tackle tax avoidance, 
secure sustainable revenue and strengthen the Single Market for busi-
nesses. The Action Plan identified 5 key areas for action. It reviews exist-
ing corporate tax policies in the European Union and aims to establish 
On 25 October 2016, the CCCTB was published5 and 
presented as an overarching initiative that could be an 
extremely effective tool for meeting the objectives of fairer 
and more efficient taxation. Furthermore, the relaunched 
proposal for a CCCTB includes rules to address some of 
the key Actions of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Project. 
To overcome the difficulties faced in obtaining approval 
for the 2011 proposal, the Commission advocated a two-
step process. For this reason, the relaunched proposal con-
sists of two separate draft directives to be implemented 
sequentially: one for a common corporate tax base (2016 
Proposed CCTB Directive)6 and the other for the CCCTB, 
which provides for consolidation as well.7 
The CCCTB package pursues, as a general objective, the 
determination of a single set of provisions for the calcu-
lation of the corporate tax base,8 including common rules 
regarding depreciation, deductible costs and incentives 
(among others, R&D tax incentives) as a replacement for 
the 28 different national regimes. 
The intention is for the 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive 
to act as a step toward re-establishing the link between 
taxation and the place where profits are earned via an 
apportionment formula comprising three factors: 1/3 for 
the value of tangible assets, 1/3 for labour (payroll and 
number of employees are equally weighted under this 
factor) and 1/3 for the value of sales by destination. In this 
way, the CCTB is intended to ref lect a balanced approach 
to distributing taxable profits amongst eligible Member 
States. Since the proposal only concerns the corporate tax 
base and is not intended to harmonize national corporate 
tax rates, each country could then apply its own rate to the 
apportioned base. If approved by all EU Member States, 
the CCTB proposal would apply from 2019. 
The CCCTB proposal lays down the conditions for the 
formation of a consolidated tax group and sets out the 
mechanism for allocating the consolidated tax base to 
the respective Member States (formulary apportion-
ment). It also provides rules for entering and leaving a 
a system of corporate taxation in the European Union whereby busi-
ness profits are taxed in the jurisdiction where value is actually created.
5. The 2011 Proposed CCTB Directive, supra n. 1, was withdrawn on the 
same day.
6. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base 
(CCTB), COM(2016) 685 final (25 Oct. 2016), EU Law IBFD [2016 Pro-
posed CCTB Directive].
7. 2016 Proposed CCCTB Directive, supra n. 2.
8. The tax base is to be calculated as revenue less exempt revenue, deduct-
ible expenses and other deductible items.
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group, including the treatment of losses.9 There are also 
anti-avoidance provisions to prevent abuses of the consol-
idation and apportionment systems, for example, involv-
ing business reorganizations and an intra-group trans-
fer of assets. Special provisions would adapt the CCTB 
rules to groups that become subject to the CCCTB rules, 
so that, for example, the interest limitation rules would be 
applied by reference to the CCCTB group. If approved by 
all EU Member States, the CCCTB proposal would apply 
from 2021.
These 2016 proposals focus not only on helping business, 
but also on countering tax avoidance.10 Consequently, 
they contain provisions intended to mirror the measures 
that were included in the ATAD Directive (2016/1164) 
(ATAD),11 which was adopted in July 2016.
Unlike the 2011 proposal, which was conceived as an 
optional scheme for EU businesses, the new rules (both 
CCTB and CCCTB) would be mandatory for large corpo-
rate groups (i.e. those with consolidated revenue exceed-
ing EUR 750 million). Meanwhile, the system would 
be optional for other companies. Another difference 
between the 2011 proposal and the relaunched proposal 
is that, under the later proposal, administrative provisions 
are limited to notification procedures. Taxpayers thus 
would continue to be bound by their national adminis-
trative provisions.
2.  Encouraging R&D under the 2016 Proposed 
CCTB Directive
According to the OECD, Research and Development 
(R&D) is key to productivity and growth.12 Moreover, 
the core of the Europe 2020 strategy is R&D, the objec-
tive being to realize overall R&D spending of 3% of gross 
domestic product (GDP).13 
With regard to benefits, many studies show a correlation 
between R&D tax incentives and an increase in private 
research spending within individual countries. Although 
it is difficult to relate increased R&D intensity directly 
to tax measures, it appears that, on average, tax incen-
tives can increase private research spending by an amount 
equal to the loss in tax revenue. The decision to support 
private R&D through direct financing and/or tax incen-
tives is to be made by governments within the context of 
their political and economic systems.14 
The Commission is not only aware that deductions should 
be provided for R&D costs in order to support innovation 
9. Mainly contained in the 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive, supra n. 6.
10. Explanatory Memorandum to the 2016 Proposed CCTB Direc-
tive, supra n. 6, at pp. 3-4, available at https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_685_en.pdf.
11. Council Directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against 
tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the inter-
nal market, OJ L 193/1 (2016), EU Law IBFD.
12. OECD, Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Inno-
vation (OECD 2013).
13. European Commission, Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 (3 Mar. 2010).
14. OECD, Tax Incentives for Research and Development: Trends and 
Issues p. 24 (OECD 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/science/
inno/2498389.pdf. 
in the economy and modernize the internal market,15 but 
also that implementation of tax incentives to encourage 
R&D is based on a tax policy decision. 
Under the relaunched proposal – as well as under the 2011 
proposal – the general rule is that income realized is, in 
principle, taxable unless specifically exempted or reduced 
by deductible expenses and other deductible items. Con-
sequently, the Commission, in order to foster R&D activi-
ties through tax measures, has expressly envisaged, under 
the 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive (similar to the origi-
nal 2011 proposal),16 a general deduction for R&D costs. 
Pursuant to article 9(1) of the 2016 Proposed CCTB Direc-
tive,17 “[e]xpenses shall be deductible only to the extent 
that they are incurred in the direct business interest of the 
taxpayer”. This means that, as a general rule, all expenses 
(including R&D expenses) are fully deductible (100%) 
in the year incurred – with the exception of immovable 
property – if they are incurred by the taxpayer for the 
purpose of the business with a view to obtaining or secur-
ing income.
Although the tax base is broadly designed, the Commis-
sion is of the opinion that:18 
taxable revenues should be reduced by business expenses and 
certain other items. Deductible business expenses should nor-
mally include all costs relating to sales and expenses linked to 
the production, maintenance and securing of income. To sup-
port innovation in the economy and modernise the internal 
market, deductions should be provided for research and devel-
opment costs.
In addition to R&D costs incurred for the purposes of the 
business, according to article 9(3) of the relaunched pro-
posal, taxpayers would be entitled to a yearly “super-de-
duction”, on R&D expenditure of up to EUR 20 million, 
of 50% (i.e. a total deduction of 150%). To the extent that 
R&D expenditure exceeds EUR 20 million, taxpayers may 
deduct 25% of the excess amount (i.e. a super-deduction of 
150% on expenditure up to EUR 20 million + a deduction 
of 125% of the excess). 
In computing the super-deduction cost base, costs related 
to movable tangible fixed assets are excluded. Presumably, 
this means that expenditures for machinery and equip-
ment are not eligible for the super-deduction. Therefore, 
this super-deduction includes current expenditures (i.e. 
wages and salaries of research personnel and the cost of 
materials) but excludes capital expenditures (i.e. the cost 
of equipment and facilities).19 
Moreover, considering that one of the key policy initia-
tives relating to the functioning of the single market is 
to support small and innovative entrepreneurship, article 
9(3) of the relaunched proposal will grant an “enhanced 
super-deduction” for small start-ups that are particu-
15. 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive, supra n. 6, at p. 8.
16. 2011 Proposed CCCTB Directive, supra n. 1.
17. Id.
18. 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive, supra n. 6, at p. 8.
19. With regard to deductible R&D expenses, a distinction is usually drawn 
between current expenditure (wages, salaries of R&D staff, cost of mate-
rials, etc.) and capital expenditure (cost of equipment and facilities used 
for R&D purposes).
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larly innovative. In this context, the deduction ceiling is 
increased and taxpayers may deduct an extra 100% of their 
R&D costs (i.e. 200%) insofar as these do not exceed EUR 
20 million and provided the enterprise: 
– is not listed and has fewer than 50 employees and an 
annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total 
that does not exceed EUR 10 million; 
– has not been registered for longer than 5 years. If the 
taxpayer is not subject to registration, the period of 5 
years may be deemed to start at the moment that the 
enterprise either starts or is liable for tax on its eco-
nomic activity; 
– was not formed through a merger; and
– does not have any associated enterprises.
Regarding the “super-deduction” and the “enhanced 
super-deduction” it must be said that the 2016 proposal 
is more generous20 than the previous 2011 proposal on this 
point, since this super-deduction allows for a deduction of 
more than 100% of the effective R&D costs, thus more than 
the actual R&D expenditure incurred by the taxpayer. In 
other words, it is a disproportionate tax advantage relative 
to the R&D costs and investment effort. In this sense, it 
can be said that super-deductions or enhanced deductions 
work similarly to a tax credit or a reduced income tax rate 
based on R&D expenditure.21 
3.  Justification for the need for Harmonization 
in the Field of R&D Tax Credits in the 
European union
It is a fact that, currently, R&D tax credits take a multi-
plicity of forms and vary significantly across EU Member 
States. There are Member States where R&D tax credits 
do not even exist (like Germany) and other countries 
where tax credits have been in place for a long time (for 
instance, France).22 A matter of special concern is the eli-
gibility conditions for an R&D tax credit, which vary 
widely. As such, R&D tax credit bases vary along mul-
tiple lines. For example, tax credits can be incremental23 
(like in Italy) or volume based24 (like in Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom); the tax base 
can also vary with firm size (for instance, in France the 
current version of the R&D tax credit does not formally 
distinguish between small and medium-sized enterprises 
20. Regarding the super-deduction, however, there is no lack of voices that 
indicate that the proposal is far less favourable for innovative multi-
nationals than the rules currently in place in a number of Member 
States, as well as in countries outside the European Union. See VNO-
NCW, Position Paper on the proposals from the European Commission 
regarding the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
Crucial disadvantages of the proposals for a European tax on profits 
(26 Nov. 2016), available at:  https://www.vno-ncw.nl/brieven-en-com 
mentaren/position-paper-proposals-european-commission-regarding- 
common-consolidated. 
21. K. Künnapas, Estonia Branch Report, in Tax Incentives on Research and 
Development (R&D) p. 281 (IFA Cahiers vol. 100a, 2015), Online Books 
IBFD.
22. L. Jacquet & S. Robin, Harmonization of R&D TAX Credits across the 
European Union: Nonsense or common sense, THEMA Working Paper 
No. 2017-05, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, p. 3 (Feb. 2017).
23. Based on the yearly variation in R&D expenditure.
24. Based on the yearly volume of R&D expenditure.
(SMEs) and large firms, while in Italy (2000-2014),25 the 
United Kingdom26 and the Netherlands27 a distinction is 
drawn between SMEs and large companies). Sometimes, 
the amount of the tax credit varies depending on the 
investment in R&D (for example, in France,28 but not in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). There may be 
a ceiling on the R&D tax credit (for example, in the Neth-
erlands, where a ceiling of EUR 14 million applies on R&D 
wages; Italy, where a ceiling of EUR 50 million applies on 
all eligible R&D; and France, where there was a ceiling 
on the tax credit that was abolished in 2008. In contrast, 
there is no ceiling in Belgium and the United Kingdom). 
R&D tax credit regimes may also be industry-specific, 
targeting certain industries and excluding others29 (like 
in France where, prior to 1992, agricultural and textile 
firms could not benefit from the French R&D tax credit, 
or the United Kingdom, where, since 2008, pharmaceu-
tical firms doing vaccine research enjoy a specific regime 
that allows them to deduct about 40% to 50% of their R&D 
personnel expenses from their taxable profit).30 
In this context, the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal has 
reignited the debate on harmonization in the field of 
direct taxes, extending this debate to R&D tax credits. 
The rationale for tax harmonization at the EU level is that, 
in the absence of harmonization, tax competition among 
Member States prevails. While tax competition may have 
a positive effect on government efficiency, it may distort 
public and private choices. In the field of R&D tax credits, 
tax competition could result in uneven increases in R&D 
investment across the European Union, with R&D expen-
ditures rising in some Member States and stagnating in 
others, which could be contrary to the Europe 2020 objec-
tive. For this reason, some degree of tax harmonization in 
terms of R&D tax credits may make sense.31 
Tax credits are essentially negative corporate taxes, 
however, and corporate taxes are included in the direct 
taxation field, which is a prerogative of Member States. For 
this reason, it is necessary to ascertain if the 2016 CCTB 
25. The rate of the R&D tax credit in Italy in 2000-2014 was 20% to 30% for 
SMEs (depending on the region), versus 15% to 25% for medium-sized 
firms and 10% to 20% for large ones; see Jacquet & Robin, supra n. 22, 
at p. 7
26. In the United Kingdom, the R&D tax credit introduced in 2000 was 
originally only available to SMEs, and a different regime for larger com-
panies was introduced in parallel in 2002. The former could deduct 50% 
of their R&D personnel expenses from their taxable profit, whereas the 
latter could deduct 25% of their R&D personnel expenses. In 2008, these 
amounts were as high as 75% of R&D personnel expenses for SMEs and 
30% for large firms; see Jacquet & Robin, supra n. 22, at p. 7.
27. In the Netherlands, the amount of the 1998 tax credit was 40% of “know-
ledge worker” wages in SMEs versus 17% in large firms. In 2004, it was 
increased to 42% for SMEs and reduced to 14% for large firms; see 
Jacquet & Robin, supra n. 22, at pp. 7-8.
28. The tax credit is equal to 30% for investments of less than EUR 100 
million and 4% for investments above this threshold; see Jacquet & 
Robin, supra n. 22, at pp. 7-8.
29. However, it must be taken into consideration that Member States are 
not totally free to design R&D measures, since they are limited by the 
EU State aid regime; see B. Pérez Bernabeu, R&D&I Tax Incentives in the 
European Union and State Aid Rules, 54 Eur. Taxn. 5, pp. 178-191 (2014), 
Journals IBFD and R. Luja, EU Report, in Tax Incentives on Research and 
Development (R&D) pp. 57-77 (IFA Cahiers vol. 100a, 2015), Online 
Books IBFD.
30. Jacquet & Robin, supra n. 22, at pp. 7-9.
31. Id., at p. 4.
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Directive Proposal regarding R&D tax credits passes the 
subsidiarity and proportionality tests, since there should 
only be action at the EU level where action by individual 
Member States cannot provide an effective solution, inas-
much as many tax problems simply require better coordi-
nation of national policies.
The R&D tax credit provided by the relaunched pro-
posal – in particular, the super-deduction – passes the 
core of the subsidiarity test, but may fail the proportion-
ality test.32 According to the proportionality principle, 
when EU action is required under the subsidiarity test, it 
should be minimal,33 i.e. the proportionality test entails 
that R&D tax incentives should not lead to a deviation 
from tax neutrality that goes beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the intended purpose.34 Despite this requirement 
of proportionality, the super deduction provided by the 
2016 CCTB Directive Proposal is too ambitious to be con-
sidered minimal intervention. Its extent goes further than 
a minimal level of harmonization aimed at avoiding an 
uneven expansion of the R&D effort across EU Member 
States since it embodies a tax advantage that goes beyond 
the real R&D expenditure incurred by the taxpayer (as it 
allows for a deduction higher than 100% of the effective 
R&D costs).
In order to be more respectful of the principle of propor-
tionality, it would be more desirable for the relaunched 
proposal to provide a measure focussed mainly on har-
monization of the R&D tax credit base, fixing a minimal 
tax credit rate that allows for complementary R&D tax 
incentives at the national level. In this respect, it is argu-
able that, perhaps, the problems regarding R&D tax incen-
tives may be resolved – at least at this early stage when 
Member States are not hiding their reluctance to adopt 
a compulsory consolidated common base – not by har-
monizing, but simply by coordinating the different R&D 
tax policies across the European Union. Harmonization 
could be postponed until a later stage of tax consolidation 
in the European Union.
4.  R&D Tax Credits Provided by article 9 of the 
CCTB Proposal: a Critical overview 
As stated in section 2., according to the 2016 CCTB Direc-
tive Proposal, all costs relating to R&D are considered a 
tax deductible expense. However, this statement requires 
further comment.
First, it should be noted that a cause and effect relationship 
between revenue and tax deductible R&D expenses is of 
particular relevance. According to the 2016 CCTB Direc-
32. Id., at p. 5.
33. Moreover, proportionality also applies to the State aid field, thus prima 
facie selective tax measures may only be justified by the nature of the 
tax system if the technical derogation is proportionate. Moreover, selec-
tive R&D tax incentives that may be approved under art. 107(3) of the 
TFEU must meet a proportionality test. Broadly speaking, under EU 
law, a measure is regarded as proportionate where (i) it has a legitimate 
aim, (ii) it is suitable, (iii) it is necessary to achieve the aim and (iv) 
the measure remains reasonable; see R. Danon, General Report, in Tax 
Incentives on Research and Development (R&D) p. 26 (IFA Cahiers vol. 
100a, 2015), Online Books IBFD.
34. Id., at p. 26.
tive Proposal, R&D costs are only deductible if they are 
incurred by the taxpayer for the purpose of the business, 
with a view to obtaining or securing income.35 This linking 
requirement is known as the “economic purpose test”, but 
due to the ambiguous and imprecise wording of article 
9(1) the door is open to a wide variety of income-related 
expenses, since the definition of “business activity” has a 
broad scope, allowing for a wide spectrum of expenses to 
be deducted from the tax base. For obvious legal certainty 
reasons, this wide array of deductible expenses needs to 
be counterbalanced by a list of non-deductible expenses36 
in order to determine which expenses are tax deductible. 
Second, it should be emphasized that although the Com-
mission has declared that the allowance for R&D expenses 
is designed to at least maintain existing R&D tax incen-
tives,37 the truth is that this proposal is not groundbreak-
ing. Such incentives are already available, in some form, 
in a large number of EU Member States and, therefore, 
the proposal does not confer an additional tax advantage 
on taxpayers undertaking R&D activities. This because 
deductible expenses associated with conducting business 
activities normally include all costs involved in sales, as 
well as generating and securing income, which includes 
R&D expenses. It can, therefore, be concluded that R&D 
expenses receive, under the 2016 CCTB Directive Pro-
posal, the same tax treatment as any other deductible 
expense, which means that this approach will not act as an 
effective incentive for companies opting into the system 
to continue to invest in R&D.
Therefore, the intention behind the Commission’s 2016 
CCTB Directive Proposal is probably harmonization.38 
Good evidence of this can be found in the fact that the 
super-deduction allows for a deduction of 150% of the 
R&D expenditure up to EUR 20 million, but this deduc-
tion is reduced to 125% on the excess amount. It seems 
obvious that if the Commission had intended to promote 
an increase in private R&D expenditure, the percentage 
applicable to the excess amount would have been higher 
than 150% on expenditure up to EUR 20 million.
From this point of view, harmonized rules on R&D tax 
incentives represent a renewed push to create an over-
arching corporate tax regime in Europe, with the aim 
of clamping down on aggressive tax planning by mul-
tinationals. The chosen means of achieving this leave 
practically no room for tax competition since article 9 
is designed such that companies will be able to benefit 
from the same deduction regardless of which Member 
State they operate in. Such uniform implementation faces, 
however, two main obstacles.
35. Moreover, the definition of qualifying R&D expenditure is also relevant 
for the purposes of the modified nexus approach applicable to patent 
boxes; id., at p. 31.
36. Provided by art. 12 of the 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive, supra n. 6.
37. Explanatory Memorandum to the 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive, 
supra n. 6, at p. 7.
38. E. Gil García, The Effect of Anti-Avoidance Provisions Regarding the Pro-
motion of Innovation: Considerations from a Tax Policy Perspective, 70 
Bull. Intl. Taxn. 10, p. 592 (2016), Journals IBFD.
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First, it is remarkable that, under the 2016 proposal, only 
costs related to immovable property are excluded from the 
super deduction tax credit base. It is thus assumed that all 
other R&D expenses are included, but this is not legally 
certain, as the proposal does not provide a definition of 
R&D activity, which is a key element in designing R&D 
input tax incentives, in particular the R&D tax credit base.
Due to the lack of an R&D activity definition in the 
relaunched proposal, the definition of what should be 
considered R&D activity for tax purposes needs to be 
resolved at the national level. It is true that most Member 
States have relied on the Frascati and Oslo manuals,39 
however, some countries have adopted a slightly differ-
ent or broader definition of R&D depending, in particular, 
on policy considerations, for instance, the level of novelty 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some jurisdic-
tions, the novelty must be new to the world (for example, 
in the United Kingdom) or in that market (for instance, in 
France) while in other jurisdictions, a novelty at the level 
of the firm is sufficient (for instance, in the Netherlands).40 
In addition, input incentives may target different R&D 
expenditure subcategories, hampering the establishment 
of a uniform R&D tax credit base across the European 
Union. It is precisely the different typologies of R&D 
expenditures that entitle a firm to a tax credit that vary the 
most among the EU Member States, which hampers har-
monization.41 Such expenditure can relate to R&D costs 
in the strict sense – for instance machinery, equipment or 
buildings – such as in Belgium where only costs regard-
ing machinery and equipment are included, whereas 
other countries like Austria and the Netherlands extend 
the incentive to cover overhead costs. Some countries 
restrict the qualifying expenditure to R&D costs that are 
incurred domestically, although such a condition is often 
more f lexible among Member States due to imperatives 
attached to the EU fundamental freedoms. For example, 
Spain allows an R&D tax credit if the R&D activities were 
developed in Spain, another Member State or EEA state.42 
Some schemes also consider R&D wages to be eligible 
costs, including, inter alia, payroll withholding taxes. 
This is so in Belgium, where an 80% exemption applies in 
respect of professional withholding taxes on wages paid 
to specific personnel with a PhD or a master’s degree in 
39. The Frascati Manual (Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for 
Surveys on Research and Experimental Development) was originally 
written by and for the experts in OECD member countries who collect 
and issue national data on research and development (R&D). Over the 
years, it has become the standard of conduct for R&D surveys and data 
collection not only in the OECD and the European Union, but also in 
several non-member economies, for example, through the science and 
technology surveys of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and 
is available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/frascatimanualproposed 
standardpracticeforsurveysonresearchandexperimentaldevelopment 
6thedition.htm. The Oslo Manual (Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Col-
lecting and Interpreting Innovation Data) is the foremost international 
source of guidelines for the collection and use of data on innovation 
activities in industry and is available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/
oslo-manual-guidelines-for-collecting-and-interpreting-innovation- 
data.htm.
40. Danon, supra n. 33, at p. 30.
41. Jacquet & Robin, supra n. 22, at pp. 7-8.
42. Gil García, supra n. 38, at p. 593.
the scientific or engineering domain employed as part of 
an R&D programme (exoneration du précompte professio-
nel). Also, in the Netherlands, a 35% wage tax reduction is 
granted to employers in respect of salaries paid to employ-
ees undertaking certain R&D activities that must be sys-
tematically organized in the country.43 
Moreover, input incentives can be related to IP expen-
diture, such as costs and expenses incurred in acquiring 
patents, investment in intangible assets or the purchase 
of new technologies. This is so in Cyprus and the Czech 
Republic, where both IP costs and IP income are covered 
by R&D incentives.44 
This situation may result in uneven implementation of 
the proposal due to mismatches in the definition of R&D 
activity and in the determination of the R&D tax credit 
base among Member States, which may interfere in allo-
cation decisions adopted by companies. Companies oper-
ating in the European Union may choose to settle in the 
territory of the Member State with the broadest legal 
definition in order to obtain a higher R&D cost deduc-
tion. Asymmetries (qualification problems) may also be 
generated in an EU cross-border context, for example, 
when a taxpayer resident in one Member State performs 
R&D activities in another Member State. In this situa-
tion, it may happen that the concrete category of R&D 
expense relevant to the activity is considered deductible 
in the Member State where the R&D activity is carried 
out but is not considered deductible in the Member State 
where the taxpayer is resident. In this situation, a contro-
versial issue arises when the taxpayer makes a claims for 
the R&D input tax incentive in the Member State where 
the company is resident because the state of residence 
will not recognize the deductibility of the expense in the 
other Member State, which does recognize the deductibil-
ity of that expense. For this reason, a common definition 
of R&D activity for tax purposes is desirable, as well as a 
correlative common definition of the R&D tax credit base 
applicable to all Member States with the goal of ensuring 
consistent implementation of the proposal. 
In close connection with the lack of an R&D definition, it 
should be noted that, based on a careful reading of article 
9, it is clear that the proposal ignores the allocation of the 
investment in qualifying the R&D expense as deductible. 
This means that it is irrelevant whether or not the expense 
is incurred in a Member State in determining whether the 
deduction should be allowed. This wording may increase 
the appeal, for EU tax resident companies, of making 
investments in R&D outside the European Union, where 
the wages and salaries of research personnel and the costs 
of materials, equipment or facilities are lower.
Given this conclusion, the question that arises is whether 
or not R&D expenditure incurred abroad, but financed 
by EU companies, is counted towards the calculation of 
3% of the European Union’s GDP, which is the target fixed 
by the Commission for investment in R&D in the Euro-
pean Union by 2020.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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In answering this question, it should be noted that sta-
tistics45 on R&D expenditure are collected by Eurostat, 
which compiles data on R&D expenditure using the 
guidelines in the Frascati manual, published in 2002 by 
the  OECD. Based on these guidelines, R&D expendi-
ture is a basic measure that covers “intramural expendi-
ture”,46 in other words, all expenditure for R&D carried 
out within a statistical unit or sector of the economy in the 
EU Member States. This implies that expenditure data is 
based on research carried out within a national territory, 
regardless of the source of funds.
Therefore, R&D expenditure incurred by taxpayers 
outside the European Union is incurred outside of the 
statistical unit and is, therefore, considered “extramural 
expenditure”.47 It is not taken into account by Eurostat 
in compiling statistics on R&D expenditure48 in order to 
assess progress toward the targeted 3% of the European 
Union’s GDP. This can lead to situations in which Member 
States will give R&D tax incentives to resident taxpayers 
in relation to R&D activity that is carried out outside the 
European Union. The resultant loss of revenue would not 
be counterbalanced by an increase in R&D expenditure 
within the European Union.
The wording of article 9 – although it may encourage 
R&D expenditure that may not be taken into consider-
ation in achieving the targeted 3% of GDP – is probably 
the consequence of the adoption (in particular regarding 
output incentives, like patent boxes) by the Commission 
of the personal nexus-based approach regarding R&D tax 
incentives, which not only overcomes a natural tendency 
45. Statistics on science, technology and innovation are based on  Deci-
sion No 1608/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the production and development of Community sta-
tistics on science and technology, OJ L 230/1 (16 Sept. 2003), avail-
able at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:32003D1608&from=EN. The Decision was implemented by 
the European Commission as  Regulation (EC) No  753/2004  on sta-
tistics on science and technology (OJ L 118/23 (23 Apr. 2004), avail-
able at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:32004R0753&from=EN), which was adopted in 2004. In 2012, 
a new European Commission Regulation (EU) No 995/2012 concerning 
the production and development of Community statistics on science 
and technology was adopted (Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 995/2012 of 26 October 2012 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Decision No 1608/2003/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council concerning the production and develop-
ment of Community statistics on science and technology (Text with 





46. Intramural expenditures are all expenditures for R&D performed 
within a statistical unit or sector of the economy during a specific 
period, whatever the source of funds. Expenditure made outside the 
statistical unit or sector but in support of intramural R&D (for example, 
the purchase of supplies for R&D) are included. Both current and capital 
expenditures are included; see OECD, Frascati Manual (6th ed., OECD 
2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/frascatiman 
ualproposedstandardpracticeforsurveysonresearchandexperimentald 
evelopment6thedition.htm. 
47. OECD, Main definitions and conventions for the measurement of 
Research and Experimental Development (R&D), A summary of the Fra-
scati Manual 1993 p. 20. French equivalent: Dépenses extra-muros de 
R&D.
48. Although they are a useful supplement to the information collected on 
intramural expenditures.
toward territoriality, i.e. a situation in which taxpayers 
perform R&D exclusively (or mainly) in the territory of 
their Member State of residence, but is also compatible 
with the EU fundamental freedoms. 
The second obstacle to uniform implementation of the 
2016 CCTB Directive Proposal regarding R&D tax incen-
tives is the fact that the super deduction included in the 
proposal is not mandatory for all corporations; the pro-
posal is only aimed at corporations with annual turn-
over of more than EUR 750 million and that are tax res-
ident in a Member State. Smaller companies may opt (or 
not) to join this scheme. The relaunched CCTB proposal, 
however, if approved by all EU Member States, would not 
result in a clean slate from its effective date of application 
(2019) – at least in the short term – as the super-deduction 
will coexist alongside the current tax credits provided by 
EU Member States. 
This scenario implies that companies that do not qualify 
or do not opt for the system provided in the CCTB pro-
posal remain subject to their national corporate tax rules, 
which may include specific R&D tax incentive schemes 
that hinder the targeted harmonization.
Finally, two aspects of the design of R&D tax incentives 
under the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal deserve partic-
ular mention. Firstly, the fact that the Commission’s pro-
posal makes the tax incentive a deduction from the tax 
base cannot be ignored. Direct deductions at the level of 
tax liability would appear to be more suitable. Super-de-
ductions essentially leave the taxpayer in the same posi-
tion with regard to tax liability, as the taxpayer will pay 
the same amount whether income is not included in the 
tax base at all or included and then excluded by means of 
a deduction from the tax base. In either instance, the tax 
incentive applies before applying the tax rate and hence 
before the amount to be paid is calculated. However, this 
approach was not decided upon lightly. Configuring the 
incentive as a deductible expense from the tax base is the 
only way to harmonize this kind of R&D tax incentive 
given that the CCTB proposal in no way contemplates 
R&D tax incentives at the tax liability level.
Second, it must be noted that the deductions under the 
Commission’s proposal privilege only R&D tax expen-
diture, i.e. are aimed solely at increasing the volume of 
R&D activity and thus are qualified as “input incentives”.49 
This means that the proposal does not provide for “output 
incentives”, i.e. tax measures that fiscally privilege income 
from R&D activities, usually in the form of intangibles, i.e. 
“patent box regimes”, which currently operate below the 
level of the tax base (like in Spain or Belgium) or consist 
in a reduced tax rate (such as in the United Kingdom or 
the Netherlands). This option, endorsed in the proposal, is 
in line with a 2014 study published by the European Com-
mission on R&D tax incentives, which does not include 
patent boxes amongst its best practices.50 
49. R&D input incentives include tax credits, enhanced super-deductions 
and accelerated depreciation.
50. “The empirical evidence suggests that input-related incentives are 
more likely to be effective than output related incentives. Input-re-
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The question that arises is whether this absence of explicit 
reference, allowing for or prohibiting output tax incen-
tives, would mean – in the event the proposal is approved 
– that the patent box regimes – present in so many EU 
Member States – will disappear in 2019 with the entry into 
force of the CCTB, generating all sorts of legal and practi-
cal difficulties for both taxpayers and tax administrations. 
If the approval of the proposal does not mean the extinc-
tion of patent boxes, the interaction between deductible 
R&D expenses and input incentives should be closely 
examined. Several countries offering a patent box, in fact, 
also provide input tax incentives. Special attention should 
be paid to, for example, situations in which an R&D super 
deduction is allocated to privileged IP income. Such an 
allocation would of course make the R&D tax incentive 
less attractive, as its tax value would then correspond to 
the lower corporate tax burden on IP income. In general, 
however, this approach is not favoured, as R&D tax incen-
tives are, as a rule, allocated to other income. 
The principle of proportionality requires some sort of 
coordination between patent boxes and input incentives. 
An R&D tax policy, pursuant to which such interaction 
is simply not addressed, may lead not only to negative tax 
rates but may also end up extending tax benefits beyond 
what is necessary.51 
5.  Final Conclusions
In light of the considerations addressed herein, it can be 
concluded that since the 2016 proposal provides for the 
same treatment of R&D expenses that many Member 
States already provide, it is not groundbreaking. The main 
objective pursued with regard to this aspect of the pro-
posal is harmonization. 
A careful reading of article 9 of the 2016 CCTB Directive 
Proposal reveals that the wording is far from perfect. It, in 
fact, raises several issues including, inter alia, the lack of a 
common definition of R&D activity and – closely related 
to this issue – a common definition of the R&D tax credit 
base. These issues are of particular concern since they may 
both lead to uneven implementation of the proposal.
The great diversity of tax instruments that have been 
developed to foster R&D activity across the European 
Union is not only the main obstacle to harmonization but 
also casts doubt on the feasibility of the rushed process 
of harmonization that is being undertaken. The current 
legislative process regarding the CCTB has been accel-
erated, especially taking into consideration the fact that 
the first concrete attempt to introduce a common consol-
idated base only dates back to 2011. This short timeframe 
lated incentives are also to be preferred from a theoretical perspective 
for two reasons. First, inventions protected by patents are much less 
likely to generate externalities, such that the case for fiscal support of 
income derived from patents is weak. Second, as not all innovation is 
patented, supporting products protected by IPR can result [in] promot-
ing sectors or types of firms that generate smaller spillovers. This may 
increase market failure rather than reduce it”, see European Commis-
sion, A study on R&D Tax Incentives (Final Report), Taxation Papers – 
Working Paper No 52, p. 75 (2014).
51. Danon, supra n. 33, at p. 43.
is not conducive to the thorough ref lection that a study 
of such a tax issue merits, in particular bearing in mind 
that approval of the relaunched proposal would result in 
a significant limitation of Member States’ autonomy on 
the crucial matter of R&D tax incentives. 
Instead of swift harmonization, it would be desirable for 
EU Member States to develop a phased-in process that is 
able to tackle the present reluctance of Member States to 
adopt the tax credit provided in article 9 of the CCTB on 
the basis that it would jeopardize a critical aspect of their 
tax sovereignty. 
In the initial stage, Member States have to agree on how to 
harmonize the R&D tax credit base (which implies decid-
ing, inter alia, whether it should apply only to SMEs or to 
all firms and whether it should encompass all R&D costs 
or only aspects of these costs, such as R&D wages). This 
would be the first step under a coordination approach, 
which would precede harmonization, with the goal of 
approximating the tax legislation of the Member States.
Once the tax credit base has been agreed upon, the Euro-
pean Union should take a second step, which would 
consist in a requirement to provide for an R&D tax credit 
in all Member States, including a minimum tax credit rate. 
Once an agreement has been reached on the tax base, it 
will be easier to gain acceptance of a mandatory R&D tax 
credit amongst all Member States.52 
Third – and only once the two previous steps are success-
fully achieved –, it would be advisable to enter into an 
extensive harmonization process in this field in order to 
develop a common definition of “R&D activity” for tax 
purposes and a detailed definition of the “R&D tax credit 
base”, which would be exactly the same for all Member 
States.
Maybe the current rush is motivated by a foreseeable 
“rebirth” of the importance of R&D tax credits as a fun-
damental tool for reducing the effective corporate tax rate, 
since Action 5 of the BEPS Project53 disincentivizes54 the 
utilization of the heavily employed output incentives 
(patent boxes) because they are considered to increase 
the risk of base erosion and profit shifting by multina-
tional groups in relation to tax jurisdictions with low or 
no taxation.55 
52. Jacquet & Robin, supra n. 22, at p. 5.
53. “Countering harmful practices more effectively, taking into account 
transparency and substance”.
54. In Oct. 2015, the OECD published its final report on Action 5 of the 
BEPS Project regarding harmful preferential tax regimes. This report 
provides a guideline (“modified nexus approach”) for the maximum 
amount of IP income that may benefit from a preferential tax regime. 
This nexus approach allows for a preferential tax rate on IP-related 
income to the extent it is connected to qualifying expenditures in the 
tax jurisdiction and determines the portion of income from each quali-
fied IP asset that is eligible for tax benefits. See OECD/G20, Countering 
Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transpar-
ency and Substance – Action 5: 2015 Final Report (OECD 2015), Inter-
national Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
55. “R&D (&I) schemes and IP regimes may give rise to a risk of base erosion 
and profit shifting. Base erosion and profit shifting is mainly under-
taken by multinational groups in relation to tax jurisdictions with low 
or non-taxation. That is, for example, jurisdictions granting special tax 
regimes, such as the patent box, or jurisdictions with a low level of taxa-
tion, i.e. tax havens” (Gil García, supra n. 38, at p. 584).
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Given the existing uncertainty regarding the 
approval56 of the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal – 
which requires unanimity in the Council – and the time 
span between approval and actual implementation of the 
56. Since the 2016 Proposed CCTB Directive, supra n. 6, is related to direct 
taxation, it falls within the ambit of art. 115 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007, OJ C115 (2008), 
EU Law IBFD, which prescribes that any legislative initiative regard-
ing direct taxation must exclusively be in the form of directives and 
requires unanimity. It is difficult, however, to predict whether or not 
a unanimous favourable decision will be reached regarding the 2016 
CCTB proposal.
relevant provisions, it would appear to be too early for 
multinational companies that fall within the scope of the 
proposed directive to begin revising EU structures to cope 
with the (eventual) future harmonized provisions.57 
57. S. Grilli, Proposed Directive on the EU Common (Consolidated) Corpo-
rate Tax Base – A primer, 4 Insights 2, p. 26 (2017).
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